Rent protection as a barrier to innovation and growth
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Publication:2373376
DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0124-4zbMATH Open1123.91033OpenAlexW2088848695MaRDI QIDQ2373376FDOQ2373376
Authors: Elias Dinopoulos, Constantinos Syropoulos 
Publication date: 19 July 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0124-4
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Cites Work
- Contest success functions
- Time Series Tests of Endogenous Growth Models
- A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction
- Research, Patenting, and Technological Change
- Economic growth and decline with endogenous property rights
- Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
- Rent protection as a barrier to innovation and growth
- Insecure property rights and growth: the role of appropriation costs, wealth effects, and heterogeneity
Cited In (13)
- Global innovation contests
- A Schumpeterian growth model with random quality improvements
- The struggle to survive in the R\&D sector: implications for innovation and growth
- Innovations, patent races and endogenous growth
- Disruptive innovation by heterogeneous incumbents and economic growth: when do incumbents switch to new technology?
- Innovate to lead or innovate to prevail: when do monopolistic rents induce growth?
- A Schumpeterian growth model with equilibrium unemployment
- Patent protection, capital accumulation, and economic growth
- Entry barriers and growth
- International trade and competitiveness
- Research and development in the growth process.
- Rent protection as a barrier to innovation and growth
- R\&D policies, endogenous growth and scale effects
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