Incentive-consistent matching processes for problems with ex ante pricing

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1056MaRDI QIDQ1339741zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael Peters

Publication date 8 December 1994

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1056

zbMATH Keywords

incentive-consistent matching technologynonstationary matching problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
• On the efficiency of ex ante and ex post pricing institutions
• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
• Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers
• A random matching theory

Cited in

(3)

• On the efficiency of ex ante and ex post pricing institutions
• Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
• A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain

This page was built for publication: Incentive-consistent matching processes for problems with ex ante pricing

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1339741)