Incentive-consistent matching processes for problems with ex ante pricing

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1056zbMATH Open0811.90024OpenAlexW2024109279MaRDI QIDQ1339741FDOQ1339741

Authors: Michael Peters 

Publication date: 8 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1056

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zbMATH Keywords

incentive-consistent matching technologynonstationary matching problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (3)

• A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
• Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
• On the efficiency of ex ante and ex post pricing institutions

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