One approach to the control of the defense sufficiency of the state
The authors propose a new arms race model delineating the series of possible relations between two states, which extend or reduce their armaments to have aggressive intension to the other repulse external threats. According to the new model, we have the case where one of the states has aggressive intentions, and the other strives to have armaments enough to repulse it. This enables us to estimate the sufficient level of defense of the state. The authors solve one of the dilemma of providing state security. The new model leads more rational results than the classical Richardson or Lanchester models. For example, if one of the states diminishes its armaments, the other state does not increase its armaments to infinity.
- Methodical aspects of substantiating the staff of the armed forces of a state from the standpoint of the theory of prevented damage
- Planning a defense that minimizes a resource deficit in the worst-case scenario of supply network destruction
- State capacity and military conflict
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1793788
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