A theory of environmental risk disclosure.

DOI10.1016/S0095-0696(02)00056-6MaRDI QIDQ1395620zbMATHFDO

Authors Estelle Gozlan, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne

Publication date 1 July 2003

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

SignallingEnvironmental reportingInformational regulationPersuasion games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring
• Inducing environmental disclosures: a dynamic mechanism design approach
• Incentives for pollution control: Regulation or information?
• Public disclosure programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm
• Toxics release information: A policy tool for environmental protection

Cited in

(4)

• Risk disclosure and firm operational efficiency
• Public disclosure programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm
• Strategic environmental disclosure: evidence from the DOE's voluntary greenhouse gas registry
• Cost perceptions and voter demand for environmental risk regulation: The double effect of hidden costs

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