A theory of environmental risk disclosure.

DOI10.1016/S0095-0696(02)00056-6zbMATH Open1039.91061MaRDI QIDQ1395620FDOQ1395620

Authors: Estelle Gozlan, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne 

Publication date: 1 July 2003

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring
• Inducing environmental disclosures: a dynamic mechanism design approach
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• Public disclosure programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm
• Toxics release information: A policy tool for environmental protection

zbMATH Keywords

SignallingEnvironmental reportingInformational regulationPersuasion games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cited In (4)

• Risk disclosure and firm operational efficiency
• Strategic environmental disclosure: evidence from the DOE's voluntary greenhouse gas registry
• Public disclosure programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm
• Cost perceptions and voter demand for environmental risk regulation: The double effect of hidden costs

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