A theory of environmental risk disclosure.

DOI10.1016/S0095-0696(02)00056-6MaRDI QIDQ1395620zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Estelle Gozlan, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne

Publication date 1 July 2003

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0095-0696(02)00056-6

zbMATH Keywords

Environmental reportingInformational regulationPersuasion gamesSignalling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring
• Inducing environmental disclosures: a dynamic mechanism design approach
• Incentives for pollution control: Regulation or information?
• Public disclosure programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm
• Toxics release information: A policy tool for environmental protection

Cited in

(5)

• Toxics release information: A policy tool for environmental protection
• Cost perceptions and voter demand for environmental risk regulation: The double effect of hidden costs
• Public disclosure programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm
• Strategic environmental disclosure: evidence from the DOE's voluntary greenhouse gas registry
• Risk disclosure and firm operational efficiency

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