Gödel's incompleteness theorems and computer science
DOI10.1023/A:1009639629935zbMATH Open0949.03002OpenAlexW194906421MaRDI QIDQ1567047FDOQ1567047
Authors: Roman Murawski
Publication date: 3 December 2000
Published in: Foundations of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1009639629935
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artificial intelligenceTuring machinephilosophy of mathematicsmind-body problemphilosophy of mindGödel's incompleteness theorems
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Logic in computer science (03B70)
Cited In (11)
- Mathematical Realism and Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems
- The impact of Gödel's incompleteness theorems on mathematics
- Logical Approaches to Computational Barriers
- Gödel's incompleteness as an argument for dualism
- Computation and intractability: echoes of Kurt Gödel
- Normativity and mechanism
- Does it follow from Gödel's incompleteness theorems that we are not machines?
- Is human mind fully algorithmic? Remarks on Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorems
- On the depth of Gödel's incompleteness theorems
- A brief note on Gödel, Nagel, minds, and machines
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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