A note on applicability of the incompleteness theorem to human mind
The author reviews Lucas' argument on an application of incompleteness theorems to show that machines can never think (of course, there are numerous counterarguments, too) and Penrose's neoclassical extension of Lucas' thesis (with its numerous countercounter arguments). Recall that many logicians hold that Gödel's theorems are not relevant to the question of the realization of intelligent machines, anymore than mathematics is relevant to the physical world! He states that in mathematics, people make ``a lot of mistakes, but these are correctable, in principle. The author's basic approach is to present relations between reflection principles (in the sense of G. Kreisel and A. Levy) and consistency.
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- Reflection Principles and their Use for Establishing the Complexity of Axiomatic Systems
- Transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic theories
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