On market games when agents cannot be in two places at once

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0745MaRDI QIDQ1577955zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rod Garratt, Cheng-Zhong Qin

Publication date 27 August 2000

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0745

zbMATH Keywords

capital goodcoalitional gameduration of the market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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(6)

• Equal treatment without large numbers
• A market interpretation of the proportional extended core
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• Multicoalitional solutions
• Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
• Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents

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