Polynomial-time key recovery attack on the Faure-Loidreau scheme based on Gabidulin codes

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Publication:1647553

DOI10.1007/S10623-017-0402-0zbMATH Open1420.94064arXiv1606.07760OpenAlexW2963026014WikidataQ62039147 ScholiaQ62039147MaRDI QIDQ1647553FDOQ1647553


Authors: Philippe Gaborit, Ayoub Otmani, Hervé Talé Kalachi Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 26 June 2018

Published in: Designs, Codes and Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Encryption schemes based on the rank metric lead to small public key sizes of order of few thousands bytes which represents a very attractive feature compared to Hamming metric-based encryption schemes where public key sizes are of order of hundreds of thousands bytes even with additional structures like the cyclicity. The main tool for building public key encryption schemes in rank metric is the McEliece encryption setting used with the family of Gabidulin codes. Since the original scheme proposed in 1991 by Gabidulin, Paramonov and Tretjakov, many systems have been proposed based on different masking techniques for Gabidulin codes. Nevertheless, over the years all these systems were attacked essentially by the use of an attack proposed by Overbeck. In 2005 Faure and Loidreau designed a rank-metric encryption scheme which was not in the McEliece setting. The scheme is very efficient, with small public keys of size a few kiloBytes and with security closely related to the linearized polynomial reconstruction problem which corresponds to the decoding problem of Gabidulin codes. The structure of the scheme differs considerably from the classical McEliece setting and until our work, the scheme had never been attacked. We show in this article that this scheme like other schemes based on Gabidulin codes, is also vulnerable to a polynomial-time attack that recovers the private key by applying Overbeck's attack on an appropriate public code. As an example we break concrete proposed 80 bits security parameters in a few seconds.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.07760




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