Distinguisher-based attacks on public-key cryptosystems using Reed-Solomon codes

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Publication:398980

DOI10.1007/S10623-014-9967-ZzbMATH Open1310.94138DBLPjournals/dcc/CouvreurGGOT14arXiv1307.6458OpenAlexW2111444563WikidataQ62039163 ScholiaQ62039163MaRDI QIDQ398980FDOQ398980


Authors: Alain Couvreur, Philippe Gaborit, Valérie Gauthier-Umaña, Ayoub Otmani, Jean-Pierre Tillich Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 18 August 2014

Published in: Designs, Codes and Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Because of their interesting algebraic properties, several authors promote the use of generalized Reed-Solomon codes in cryptography. Niederreiter was the first to suggest an instantiation of his cryptosystem with them but Sidelnikov and Shestakov showed that this choice is insecure. Wieschebrink proposed a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem which consists in concatenating a few random columns to a generator matrix of a secretly chosen generalized Reed-Solomon code. More recently, new schemes appeared which are the homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Bogdanov and Lee, and a variation of the McEliece cryptosystem proposed by Baldi et extit{al.} which hides the generalized Reed-Solomon code by means of matrices of very low rank. In this work, we show how to mount key-recovery attacks against these public-key encryption schemes. We use the concept of distinguisher which aims at detecting a behavior different from the one that one would expect from a random code. All the distinguishers we have built are based on the notion of component-wise product of codes. It results in a powerful tool that is able to recover the secret structure of codes when they are derived from generalized Reed-Solomon codes. Lastly, we give an alternative to Sidelnikov and Shestakov attack by building a filtration which enables to completely recover the support and the non-zero scalars defining the secret generalized Reed-Solomon code.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.6458




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