Free entry and social inefficiency under co-opetition

DOI10.1007/s00712-015-0469-xzbMath1408.91077OpenAlexW2170476494MaRDI QIDQ1654087

Keisuke Hattori, Takeshi Yoshikawa

Publication date: 7 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44816/1/MPRA_paper_44816.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common property resourcesfree entryexcess entryentry regulations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

The combination of two tragedies: commons and anticommons tragedies ⋮ An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications ⋮ Inter-group competition through joint marketing efforts and intra-group Cournot competition

Cites Work

• Excessive entry and the integer constraint with many firms: A note
• Excess entry in the absence of scale economies
• Symmetric Cournot oligopoly and economic welfare: A synthesis
• Entry regulation and social welfare with an integer problem.
• Equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model
• Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare
• Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition

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