The study of a mathematical model in information acquisition and disclosure

DOI10.1155/2015/491328MaRDI QIDQ1665813zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Ce Huang

Publication date 27 August 2018

Published in Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/491328

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Decision theory (91B06) Economics of information (91B44)

Review text

Summary: A mathematical model involving a decision maker and an expert is investigated. Through analyzing the model, we obtain several results on the expert's information acquisition and disclosure strategy. When withholding information is costly to the expert, in equilibrium, an expert with a higher withholding cost acquires less information but discloses more acquired information. We also examine which expert is optimal to the decision maker among a group of experts with different costs of withholding information.

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(3)

• A mathematical model of communication with reputational concerns
• The study of the strategic consequences of a scoring model disclosure
• A formal analysis of information disclosure in data exchange

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