Pass-through, vertical contracts, and bargains
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Recommendations
- Cost pass-through and inverse demand curvature in vertical relationships with upstream and downstream competition
- Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data
- Double marginalization and cost pass-through: Weyl-Fabinger and Cowan meet Spengler and Bresnahan-Reiss
- Pricing and market conduct in a vertical relationship
- A note on the classification of consumer demand functions with respect to retailer pass-through rates
Cites work
- A structural approach to identifying the sources of local currency price stability
- Cost pass-through and inverse demand curvature in vertical relationships with upstream and downstream competition
- Double marginalization and cost pass-through: Weyl-Fabinger and Cowan meet Spengler and Bresnahan-Reiss
- Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations
- Vertical Contracts in the Video Rental Industry
- Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data
Cited in
(13)- Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship
- The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices
- Quid pro quo CSR and trade liberalization in a bilateral monopoly
- Negotiation-sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain: a coopetitive-game analysis
- A note on the classification of consumer demand functions with respect to retailer pass-through rates
- Double marginalization and cost pass-through: Weyl-Fabinger and Cowan meet Spengler and Bresnahan-Reiss
- Cost pass-through and inverse demand curvature in vertical relationships with upstream and downstream competition
- Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data
- Vertical cross-ownership, double marginalization, and social welfare
- Double markups under bilateral vertical contracting
- Alternative forms of buyer power in a vertical duopoly: implications for profits, welfare, and cost pass-through
- Two-part tariff, demand uncertainty and double marginalization: an experiment
- Vertical control, opportunism, and risk sharing
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