Optimal rationing of productive public services under tax competition

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.12.003zbMATH Open1398.91267OpenAlexW2566825212MaRDI QIDQ1672802FDOQ1672802

Authors: James P. Feehan, Mutsumi Matsumoto 

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.003

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zbMATH Keywords

rationingtax competitionbenefit taxationproductive public services

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Public goods (91B18)

Cited In (2)

• Coordination of optimal taxation in a two-country equilibrium model
• Optimal public good provision in the Ramsey tax model. A generalization

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