A Nash tax game extending the generality of the Henry George theorem.

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00212-8MaRDI QIDQ1606286zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Mitch Kunce

Publication date 24 July 2002

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsmobile capitalNash fax competitiontax on land

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

• Aggregate Land Rents, Expenditure on Public Goods, and Optimal City Size

Cited in

(4)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 716526 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal rationing of productive public services under tax competition
• Why do some good bear higher taxes than others?
• The supermodularity of the tax competition game

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