The equilibrium effort-wage elasticity in efficiency-wage models
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Publication:1676702
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90030-5zbMATH Open1375.91136OpenAlexW1986766235MaRDI QIDQ1676702FDOQ1676702
Authors: Jan Beyer Schmidt-Sørensen 
Publication date: 9 November 2017
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90030-5
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