Supervision and effort in an intertemporal efficiency wage model: the role of the Solow condition

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00239-6zbMATH Open0953.91024OpenAlexW2072266747MaRDI QIDQ1978341FDOQ1978341

Authors: João Ricardo Faria 

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00239-6

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zbMATH Keywords

unemploymentefficiency wagesturnoverlabor-management relations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Efficiency wages: combining the shirking and turnover cost models
• The turnover costs and the Solow condition in an efficiency wage model with intertemporal optimization

Cited In (4)

• Profitability, investment, and efficiency wages
• Efficiency-wage competition and nonlinear dynamics
• On the relationship between wages and monitoring in shirking models.
• Effort Observability and Wage Promotion in an Internal Labor Market

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