Intuitionistc probability and the Bayesian objection to dogmatism

DOI10.1007/S11229-016-1120-2MaRDI QIDQ1708894zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Peng Zhang

Publication date 27 March 2018

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1120-2

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian confirmation theoryclassical logicclassical probabilitydogmatismintuitionistic logicintuitionistic probability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Subsystems of classical logic (including intuitionistic logic) (03B20) Intuitionistic mathematics (03F55) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

Recommendations

• From classical to intuitionistic probability
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Cites work

• Between probability and certainty. What justifies belief
• From classical to intuitionistic probability

Cited in

(3)

• Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
• From classical to intuitionistic probability
• Fifteen arguments against hypothetical frequentism

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