Probability theory, intuitionism, semantics, and the Dutch book argument
In a previous paper, the authors provided a set of constraints for a new theory of conditional probability. In the present paper, they show that there are functions satisfying the given constraints which take on any finite number of values and also that there are functions satisfying that constraints which are infinitely valued. Then they consider a very common epistemic interpretation of classical probability. Finally, they compare their intuitionistic probability theory with classical probability theory and they isolate two of the given constraints as being non classical. Moreover the authors try to give justifications for these two constraints.
- On the significance of conditional probabilities
- Dutch books and nonclassical probability spaces
- Intuitionistc probability and the Bayesian objection to dogmatism
- Conditionals, probability, and non-triviality
- The problem of dispersion-free probabilities in Gleason-type theorems for a two-dimensional Hilbert space
- KOLMOGOROV CONDITIONALIZERS CAN BE DUTCH BOOKED (IF AND ONLY IF THEY ARE EVIDENTIALLY UNCERTAIN)
- From classical to intuitionistic probability
- Generalized probabilism: Dutch books and accuracy domination
- Truth values of quantum phenomena
- Probability functions and their assumption sets. The singulary case
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