A comparative study of marketing channel multiagent Stackelberg model based on perfect rationality and fairness preference
DOI10.1155/2014/527458zbMATH Open1474.91028OpenAlexW2120038013WikidataQ59039180 ScholiaQ59039180MaRDI QIDQ1724331FDOQ1724331
Authors: Xu Yang, Yiwan Sun, Chuan Ding, Kai-Hong Wang
Publication date: 14 February 2019
Published in: Abstract and Applied Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/527458
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Cites Work
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Social preferences and supply chain performance: an experimental study
- Coordination of a supply chain with one-manufacturer and two-retailers under demand promotion and disruption management decisions
- Designing pricing contracts for boundedly rational customers: does the framing of the fixed fee matter?
- Estimating the influence of fairness on bargaining behavior
- Channel coordination mechanism with retailers having fairness preference -- an improved quantity discount mechanism
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