Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2017.06.007zbMath1409.91120OpenAlexW2729926208MaRDI QIDQ1728298

Toshiji Miyakawa, Tomohiko Kawamori

Publication date: 22 February 2019

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyNash bargaining solutionexternalitiesrenegotiationsnoncooperative coalitional bargainingbargaining-blocking-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations

Cites Work

• Nash bargaining solution under externalities
• Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations
• Contracting with externalities and outside options
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements

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