Regulation under partial cooperation: the case of a queueing system

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2014.02.006zbMath1408.90069OpenAlexW2049517733MaRDI QIDQ1785217

Refael Hassin, Gail Gilboa-Freedman

Publication date: 28 September 2018

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2014.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

queueingbinary altruismpartial control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (1)

Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers

Cites Work

• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• Pricing surplus server capacity for mean waiting time sensitive customers
• The Price of Anarchy in the Markovian Single Server Queue
• Centralized vs. Decentralized Ambulance Diversion: A Network Perspective
• Altruism in Atomic Congestion Games
• Optimal control of admission to a multiserver queue with two arrival streams
• Second-Best Congestion Pricing: The Case of an Untolled Alternative
• Pricing and Design of Differentiated Services: Approximate Analysis and Structural Insights
• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
• Customers' Optimal Joining Rules for the GI/M/s Queue

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