Ambiguity in election games

DOI10.1007/S100580200081MaRDI QIDQ1811245zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Enriqueta Aragonès, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date 2002

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10230/793, https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=364

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumvoters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(6)

• How good is a two-party election game?
• Vagueness in multidimensional proposals
• A note on pivotality
• Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting
• Analyzing Electoral Promises with Game Theory
• Making statements and approval voting

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