Coherent odds and subjective probability
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1867353
DOI10.1006/jmps.2001.1387zbMath1027.91027OpenAlexW2076736028WikidataQ59708220 ScholiaQ59708220MaRDI QIDQ1867353
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jmps.2001.1387
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Dynamically consistent beliefs must be Bayesian
- First order versus second order risk aversion
- Axiomatic utility theories with the betweenness property
- Risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities
- Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilities
- Consequentialist foundations for expected utility
- Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
- Quality-adjusted life years (QALY) utility models under expected utility and rank dependent utility assumptions
- The role of aspiration level in risky choice: A comparison of cumulative prospect theory and SP/A theory
- An axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory
- Separating marginal utility and probabilistic risk aversion
- Dynamic consistency implies approximately expected utility preferences
- Reduction invariance and Prelec's weighting functions
- "Making Book Against Oneself," The Independence Axiom, and Nonlinear Utility Theory
- Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
- "Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom
- A Theory of Disappointment Aversion
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- The Probability Weighting Function
- The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- On a Theorem of De Finetti, Oddsmaking, and Game Theory
- Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
This page was built for publication: Coherent odds and subjective probability