The foreclosure argument for exclusive dealing: the case of differentiated retailers

DOI10.1007/BF01237244zbMATH Open0856.90039MaRDI QIDQ1923973FDOQ1923973

Authors: Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen 

Publication date: 3 February 1997

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

nonempty corecooperative characteristic-form game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts

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