The exclusion principle for symmetric multi-prize all-pay auctions with endogenous valuations

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00041-7MaRDI QIDQ1927329zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Maria Arbatskaya

Publication date 1 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00041-7

zbMATH Keywords

contestentryexclusion principlemulti-prize all-pay auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Contests with endogenous entry
• All-Pay Contests
• Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
• A note on the exclusion principle
• Performance-maximizing large contests

Cited in

(1)

• A note on the exclusion principle

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