Disagreement leads to complete learning: sequential choice with continuous types

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.11.011zbMATH Open1255.91058OpenAlexW2035064879MaRDI QIDQ1934835FDOQ1934835

Authors: Thomas Wiseman 

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.11.011

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zbMATH Keywords

observational learningherdinginformational cascades

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• On the convergence of informational cascades
• Social learning with private and common values

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