Disagreement leads to complete learning: sequential choice with continuous types

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.11.011MaRDI QIDQ1934835zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas Wiseman

Publication date 29 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.11.011

zbMATH Keywords

observational learningherdinginformational cascades

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation
• Learning with minimal information in continuous games
• Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements?
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• A general analysis of sequential social learning

Cites work

• On the convergence of informational cascades
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• Social learning with private and common values

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