Power measures derived from the sequential query process

From MaRDI portal
Publication:1950239

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2012.11.003zbMATH Open1262.91031arXiv1202.1882OpenAlexW2014844078MaRDI QIDQ1950239FDOQ1950239

Reyhaneh Reyhani, Geoffrey Pritchard, Mark C. Wilson

Publication date: 10 May 2013

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We study a basic sequential model for the discovery of winning coalitions in a simple game, well known from its use in defining the Shapley-Shubik power index. We derive in a uniform way a family of measures of collective and individual power in simple games, and show that, as for the Shapley-Shubik index, they extend naturally to measures for TU-games. In particular, the individual measures include all weighted semivalues. We single out the simplest measure in our family for more investigation, as it is new to the literature as far as we know. Although it is very different from the Shapley value, it is closely related in several ways, and is the natural analogue of the Shapley value under a nonstandard, but natural, definition of simple game. We illustrate this new measure by calculating its values on some standard examples.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1202.1882




Recommendations




Cited In (4)





This page was built for publication: Power measures derived from the sequential query process

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1950239)