A foundationalist view of the AGM theory of belief change
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Publication:1978245
DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(99)00092-2zbMATH Open0943.68148MaRDI QIDQ1978245FDOQ1978245
Authors: Alexander Bochman 
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
- Nonmonotonic inference based on expectations
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- A foundational theory of belief and belief change
- Belief contraction as nonmonotonic inference
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- Entrenchment versus dependence: Coherence and foundations in belief change
Cited In (4)
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