A foundationalist view of the AGM theory of belief change
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Publication:1978245
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4166927 (Why is no real title available?)
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- A foundational theory of belief and belief change
- Belief contraction as nonmonotonic inference
- Belief contraction in the context of the general theory of rational choice
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- Knowledge in flux. Modeling the dynamics of epistemic states
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- Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
- On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
- On the status of the postulate of recovery in the logic of theory change
- Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment
- Propositional knowledge base revision and minimal change
- Severe withdrawal (and recovery)
- Theory contraction and base contraction unified
- Theory contraction through base contraction
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