Knowledge transfer incentives and optimal privatization via rival's partial equity ownership

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.109970MaRDI QIDQ1984469zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fenghui Lai, Dazhong Wang, Nan Yang

Publication date 16 September 2021

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109970

zbMATH Keywords

knowledge transferpartial equity ownershippartial privatization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Cites work

• Mixed duopoly, cross-ownership and partial privatization

Cited in

(3)

• The choice of the voting structure for privatizing a company
• Product innovation transfer under passive partial ownership holdings
• Passive cross-holdings, horizontal differentiation, and welfare

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