Passive cross-holdings, horizontal differentiation, and welfare

DOI10.1111/BOER.12436MaRDI QIDQ6540724zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jing Fang, Jingyi Huang, Chenhang Zeng

Publication date 17 May 2024

Published in Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/BOER.12436

zbMATH Keywords

antitrusthorizontal differentiationpassive ownershipsocial welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• Collusive stability of cross-holding with cost asymmetry
• Incentive and welfare implications of cross-holdings in oligopoly
• Interlocking cross-ownership in a unionised duopoly: when social welfare benefits from ``more collusion
• Knowledge transfer incentives and optimal privatization via rival's partial equity ownership
• Mixed duopoly, cross-ownership and partial privatization
• Overlapping ownership, endogenous quality, and welfare
• Partial passive ownership holdings and licensing
• Passive cross holding as a strategic entry deterrence
• Passive cross-holding in a Stackelberg oligopoly
• Product innovation transfer under passive partial ownership holdings
• Product positioning with overlapping ownership
• Silent financial interests and product innovation
• Strategic trade policy with interlocking cross-ownership
• The effects of optimal cross holding in an asymmetric oligopoly

Cited in

(1)

• Welfare effects of passive partial ownership in differentiated Bertrand duopoly with optimal technology licensing

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