Theory choice, theory change, and inductive truth-conduciveness

DOI10.1007/S11225-018-9809-5MaRDI QIDQ2009769zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Konstantin Genin, Kevin T. Kelly

Publication date 29 November 2019

Published in Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-018-9809-5

zbMATH Keywords

learningreliabilitybelief revisionsimplicitytheory choiceformal epistemologyOckham's razor

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational learning theory (68Q32) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3136643 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233702 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3103519 (Why is no real title available?)
• Abductive Belief Revision in Science
• Algorithmic Learning Theory
• Comparison of identification criteria for machine inductive inference
• Generalized notions of mind change complexity
• How simplicity helps you find the truth without pointing at it
• Knowledge in flux. Modeling the dynamics of epistemic states
• Language identification in the limit
• Mind change efficient learning
• Ockham's razor, empirical complexity, and truth-finding efficiency
• On the solvability of inductive problems: a study in epistemic topology
• Philosophy of statistics.
• Propositional reasoning that tracks probabilistic reasoning
• Simplicity, truth, and the unending game of science
• Trial and error predicates and the solution to a problem of Mostowski
• Truth-tracking by belief revision

Cited in

(3)

• Objectivity, ambiguity, and theory choice
• Secretive interaction. Players and strategies
• Realism, rhetoric, and reliability

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