Cooperation in a generalized age-structured spatial game
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Publication:2010858
Abstract: The emergence and prevalence of cooperative behavior within a group of selfish individuals remains a puzzle for ext{evolutionary game theory} precisely because it conflicts directly with the central idea of natural selection. Accordingly, in recent years, the search for an understanding of how cooperation can be stimulated, even when it conflicts with individual interest, has intensified. We investigate the emergence of cooperation in an age-structured evolutionary spatial game. In it, players age with time and the payoff that they receive after each round ext{depends on} their age. ext{We find that t}he outcome of the game is strongly influenced by the type of distribution used to modify the payoffs according to the age of each player. The results show that, under certain circumstances, cooperators may not only survive but dominate the population.
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Cites work
Cited in
(6)- COOPERATION, COLLECTIVES FORMATION AND SPECIALIZATION
- AGE-RELATED PREFERENTIAL SELECTION CAN PROMOTE COOPERATION IN THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5583615 (Why is no real title available?)
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