Partially observable stochastic games for cyber deception against network epidemic
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-64793-3_17zbMATH Open1483.68051OpenAlexW3117166073MaRDI QIDQ2056955FDOQ2056955
Authors: Olivier Tsemogne, Y. Hayel, Charles A. Kamhoua, Gabriel Deugoué 
Publication date: 8 December 2021
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64793-3_17
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Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Applications of game theory (91A80) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Computer security (68M25)
Cites Work
Cited In (8)
- Corruption and botnet defense: a mean field game approach
- The Stackelberg equilibrium for one-sided zero-sum partially observable stochastic games
- A partially observable stochastic zero-sum game for a network epidemic control problem
- Partially observable stochastic games for cyber deception against network epidemic
- Game theory on attack graph for cyber deception
- A network centrality game for epidemic control
- Optimizing intrusion detection systems placement against network virus spreading using a partially observable stochastic minimum-threat path game
- A network centrality game based on a compact representation of defender's belief for epidemic control
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