(Un)stable matchings with blocking costs

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2021.07.005OpenAlexW3182337489MaRDI QIDQ2060342FDOQ2060342

Authors: Yuri Faenza, Ioannis Mourtos, Michalis Samaris, Jay Sethuraman 

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.07.005

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zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingrotation posetblocking edges

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Cites Work

• The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Size versus stability in the marriage problem
• An improved approximation lower bound for finding almost stable maximum matchings
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Socially stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem
• Popular matchings in the stable marriage problem

Cited In (1)

• On Pareto optimal balanced exchanges

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