CEO bias and product substitutability in oligopoly games

DOI10.3390/G13020028MaRDI QIDQ2091663zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elizabeth Schroeder, Carol Horton Tremblay, Victor J. Tremblay

Publication date 2 November 2022

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g13020028

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot modelbehavioral economicsCournot-Bertrand modelBertrand modelfirm objectives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3523293 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bounded rationality in industrial organization
• Consumer heterogeneity and paid search effectiveness: a large-scale field experiment
• Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
• Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication

Cited in

(1)

• Are CEOs expected utility maximizers?

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