CEO bias and product substitutability in oligopoly games

DOI10.3390/G13020028zbMATH Open1501.91100OpenAlexW4220931601MaRDI QIDQ2091663FDOQ2091663

Victor J. Tremblay, Elizabeth Schroeder, Carol Horton Tremblay

Publication date: 2 November 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13020028

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot modelbehavioral economicsCournot-Bertrand modelBertrand modelfirm objectives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

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• Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
• Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
• Consumer Heterogeneity and Paid Search Effectiveness: A Large-Scale Field Experiment

Cited In (1)

• Are CEOs expected utility maximizers?

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