Escaping Braess's paradox through approximate Caratheodory's theorem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2094366
DOI10.1016/j.ipl.2022.106289OpenAlexW4281632415WikidataQ113872245 ScholiaQ113872245MaRDI QIDQ2094366
Dimitris Fotakis, Thanasis Lianeas, Kyriakos Sergis, Sotirios Dimos
Publication date: 28 October 2022
Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2022.106289
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Efficient methods for selfish network design
- Network characterizations for excluding Braess's paradox
- Sensitivity of Wardrop equilibria
- On sparse approximations to randomized strategies and convex combinations
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- Resolving Braess's paradox in random networks
- On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
- Braess's Paradox in large random graphs
- Braess's paradox in expanders
- BRAESS' PARADOX IN A TWO-TERMINAL TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
- Approximating Nash Equilibria and Dense Subgraphs via an Approximate Version of Carathéodory's Theorem
- Sensitivity Analysis for Convex Separable Optimization Over Integral Polymatroids
- Matroids Are Immune to Braess’ Paradox
- Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
This page was built for publication: Escaping Braess's paradox through approximate Caratheodory's theorem
