Sensitivity of Wardrop equilibria
From MaRDI portal
Publication:987396
DOI10.1007/S00224-009-9196-4zbMATH Open1203.90046OpenAlexW2129319165MaRDI QIDQ987396FDOQ987396
Authors: Matthias Englert, Thomas Franke, Lars Olbrich 
Publication date: 13 August 2010
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/47592/1/fulltext21.pdf
Recommendations
Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Games involving graphs (91A43)
Cites Work
- Worst-case equilibria
- On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
- Traffic assignment problem for a general network
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Sensitivity analysis for the asymmetric network equilibrium problem
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Cited In (11)
- Computing all Wardrop equilibria parametrized by the flow demand
- Sensitivity and robustness of mechanism balancing.
- On the price of anarchy of highly congested nonatomic network games
- Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria
- Robust Wardrop Equilibrium
- Sensitivity analysis for a Cournot equilibrium
- The price of anarchy in routing games as a function of the demand
- Price of anarchy for highly congested routing games in parallel networks
- Sensitivity of wardrop equilibria: revisited
- Stackelberg pricing games with congestion effects
- Escaping Braess's paradox through approximate Caratheodory's theorem
This page was built for publication: Sensitivity of Wardrop equilibria
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q987396)
