Corporate debt choice and bank capital regulation
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Publication:2102862
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Cites work
- A Macroeconomic Model With Financially Constrained Producers and Intermediaries
- Aggregate implications of corporate debt choices
- Banking and shadow banking
- Capital Buffers in a Quantitative Model of Banking Industry Dynamics
- Dynamic banking with non-maturing deposits
- Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System
- Financial intermediary capital
- Reorganization or Liquidation: Bankruptcy Choice and Firm Dynamics
Cited in
(9)- Taxes, regulations and the corporate debt market
- Aggregate implications of corporate debt choices
- Dynamic banking with non-maturing deposits
- Corporate spin-offs, bankruptcy, investment, and the value of debt
- A Welfare Analysis of Regulation in Relationship Banking Markets
- The transmission of bank funding to corporate loans: deleveraging in Germany
- Optimal bank interest margin under capital regulation: regret aversion and shadow banking
- Corporate finance, monetary policy, and aggregate demand
- Third-Party Credit Guarantees and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Corporate Loans
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