Optimal bank interest margin under capital regulation: regret aversion and shadow banking
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Recommendations
- Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System
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Cites work
Cited in
(11)- Shadow banking and financial regulation: a small-scale DSGE perspective
- Wealth management products, banking competition, and stability: evidence from China
- Banks to basics! Why banking regulation should focus on equity
- Optimal bank loan rate and default risk in equity return under capital regulation and deposit insurance
- Optimal leverage ratio and capital requirements with limited regulatory power
- Estimation error in regulatory capital requirements: theoretical implications for consumer bank profitability
- Governance mechanisms and bank interest margins: an examination of loan commitment with external financing
- Loan commitments, asymmetric information and capital regulation: an explanation for the synergy or narrow-banking management
- Unintended consequences of the market risk requirement in banking regulation
- Integrating market conditions into regulatory decisions on microfinance interest rates: does competition matter?
- Proprietary trading losses in banks: do banks invest sufficiently in control?
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