Popularity-driven fitness calculation promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
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Publication:2120495
Recommendations
- Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
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- An improved fitness evaluation mechanism with memory in spatial prisoner's dilemma game on regular lattices
- Incorporating the information from direct and indirect neighbors into fitness evaluation enhances the cooperation in the social dilemmas
- Coveting neighbors' wisdom promotes cooperation in structured populations
Cites work
- Aspiration driven coevolution resolves social dilemmas in networks
- Conditional neutral punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- Cooperation in two-dimensional mixed-games
- Evolution of cooperation on independent networks: the influence of asymmetric information sharing updating mechanism
- Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games
- Game theory and physics
- Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- The evolution of cooperation
Cited in
(12)- Acceptability of strategy promotes cooperation in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
- Ability-based asymmetrical fitness calculation promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
- Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- The influence of quasi-cooperative strategy on social dilemma evolution
- Environmental-based defensive promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Successful initial positioning of non-cooperative individuals in cooperative populations effectively hinders cooperation prosperity
- Evolution of co-operation among mobile agents with different influence
- Popularity-driven strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Incorporating the information from direct and indirect neighbors into fitness evaluation enhances the cooperation in the social dilemmas
- Unfairness promotes the evolution of cooperation
- Cooperative evolution under the joint influence of local popularity and global popularity
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