Popularity-driven fitness calculation promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
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Publication:2120495
DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2020.109701zbMATH Open1483.91038OpenAlexW3009005923MaRDI QIDQ2120495FDOQ2120495
Authors: Shulan Li, Lijun Hong, Yini Geng, Chen Shen 
Publication date: 31 March 2022
Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2020.109701
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Cites Work
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games
- The evolution of cooperation
- Game theory and physics
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Cooperation in two-dimensional mixed-games
- Conditional neutral punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Evolution of cooperation on independent networks: the influence of asymmetric information sharing updating mechanism
- Aspiration driven coevolution resolves social dilemmas in networks
- Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Cited In (12)
- Ability-based asymmetrical fitness calculation promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
- Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- The influence of quasi-cooperative strategy on social dilemma evolution
- Environmental-based defensive promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Successful initial positioning of non-cooperative individuals in cooperative populations effectively hinders cooperation prosperity
- Evolution of co-operation among mobile agents with different influence
- Popularity-driven strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Incorporating the information from direct and indirect neighbors into fitness evaluation enhances the cooperation in the social dilemmas
- Cooperative evolution under the joint influence of local popularity and global popularity
- Unfairness promotes the evolution of cooperation
- Acceptability of strategy promotes cooperation in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
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