A stealthy hardware Trojan based on a statistical fault attack

DOI10.1007/S12095-021-00480-4MaRDI QIDQ2120995zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Charles Momin, Olivier Bronchain, François-Xavier Standaert

Publication date 1 April 2022

Published in Cryptography and Communications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s12095-021-00480-4

zbMATH Keywords

statistical fault attacksstealthy hardware Trojans

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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Cites work

• A differential fault attack technique against SPN structures, with application to the AES and KHAZAD.
• Advanced Encryption Standard – AES
• Hardware Trojan Detection by Multiple-Parameter Side-Channel Analysis
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1088257 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1394292 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mode-level vs. implementation-level physical security in symmetric cryptography. A practical guide through the leakage-resistance jungle
• The first thorough side-channel hardware Trojan

Cited in

(5)

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• Hardware Trojan detection via rewriting logic
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• Acceleration of Spatial Correlation Based Hardware Trojan Detection Using Shared Grids Ratio
• Reversing stealthy dopant-level circuits

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