On the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement

From MaRDI portal
Publication:2121502

DOI10.1007/S00145-022-09421-7zbMATH Open1489.94092arXiv1907.11329OpenAlexW4214936143MaRDI QIDQ2121502FDOQ2121502


Authors: Ran Cohen, Iftach Haitner, Nikolaos Makriyannis, Matan Orland, Alex Samorodnitsky Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 4 April 2022

Published in: Journal of Cryptology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We prove lower bounds on the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement (BA) protocols, bounding the halting probability of such protocols after one and two rounds. In particular, we prove that: (1) BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate (under attack) at the end of the first round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2+o(1)]. (2) BA protocols resilient against a fraction of corruptions greater than 1/4 terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most 1Theta(1). (3) For a large class of protocols (including all BA protocols used in practice) and under a plausible combinatorial conjecture, BA protocols resilient against a fraction of corruptions greater than 1/3 [resp., 1/4] terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2+o(1)]. The above bounds hold even when the parties use a trusted setup phase, e.g., a public-key infrastructure (PKI). The third bound essentially matches the recent protocol of Micali (ITCS'17) that tolerates up to n/3 corruptions and terminates at the end of the third round with constant probability.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.11329




Recommendations




Cites Work


Cited In (12)





This page was built for publication: On the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2121502)