Debiasing or regularisation? Two interpretations of the concept of `true preference' in behavioural economics
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Publication:2125263
DOI10.1007/S11238-022-09876-XzbMATH Open1484.91156OpenAlexW4214764418MaRDI QIDQ2125263FDOQ2125263
Authors: Robert Sugden
Publication date: 13 April 2022
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-022-09876-x
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Cites Work
- Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Making descriptive use of prospect theory to improve the prescriptive use of expected utility
- Violations of the independence axiom in common ratio problems: An experimental test of some competing hypotheses
- On money pumps
Cited In (2)
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