An empirical analysis of privacy in the lightning network

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-64322-8_8MaRDI QIDQ2145379zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 17 June 2022

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.12470, https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10121448/

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99) Cryptography (94A60)

Abstract: Payment channel networks, and the Lightning Network in particular, seem to offer a solution to the lack of scalability and privacy offered by Bitcoin and other blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. Previous research has focused on the scalability, availability, and crypto-economics of the Lightning Network, but relatively little attention has been paid to exploring the level of privacy it achieves in practice. This paper presents a thorough analysis of the privacy offered by the Lightning Network, by presenting several attacks that exploit publicly available information about the network in order to learn information that is designed to be kept secret, such as how many coins a node has available or who the sender and recipient are in a payment routed through the network.

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Cites work

• An algorithm for finding shortest routes from all source nodes to a given destination in general networks
• LockDown: balance availability attack against lightning network channels
• Topological Analysis of Bitcoin’s Lightning Network

Cited in

(14)

• Everything you ever wanted to know about bitcoin mixers (but were afraid to ask)
• Cross-layer deanonymization methods in the lightning protocol
• The complex shape of anonymity in cryptocurrencies: case studies from a systematic approach
• Congestion attacks in payment channel networks
• Decentralized privacy-preserving netting protocol on blockchain for payment systems
• LockDown: balance availability attack against lightning network channels
• Ride the lightning: the game theory of payment channels
• How to profit from payments channels
• Chameleon hash time-lock contract for privacy preserving payment channel networks
• Evaluating cryptonote-style blockchains
• Analysis and probing of parallel channels in the lightning network
• \textsc{Hide} \& \textsc{Seek}: privacy-preserving rebalancing on payment channel networks
• Enabling scalable and unlinkable payment channel hubs with oblivious puzzle transfer
• Epoch: enabling path concealing payment channel hubs with optimal path encryption

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Uses Software

• CLoTH
• GitHub

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