Congestion attacks in payment channel networks

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-64331-0_9zbMATH Open1493.91155arXiv2002.06564OpenAlexW3210715031MaRDI QIDQ2147240FDOQ2147240

Ayelet Mizrahi, Aviv Zohar

Publication date: 22 June 2022

Abstract: Payment channel networks provide a fast and scalable solution to relay funds, acting as a second layer to slower and less scalable blockchain protocols. In this paper, we present an accessible, low-cost attack in which the attacker paralyzes multiple payment network channels for several days. The attack is based on overloading channels with requests that are kept unresolved until their expiration time. Reaching the maximum allowed unresolved requests (HTLCs) locks the channel for new payments. The attack is in fact inherent to the way off-chain networks are constructed, since limits on the number of unresolved payments are derived from limits on the blockchain. We consider three main versions of the attack: one in which the attacker attempts to block as many high liquidity channels as possible, one in which it disconnects as many pairs of nodes as it can, and one in which it tries to isolate individual nodes from the network. We evaluate the costs of these attacks on Bitcoin's Lightning Network and compare how changes in the network have affected the cost of attack. Specifically, we consider how recent changes to default parameters in each of the main Lightning implementations contribute to the attacks. As we evaluate the attacks, we also look at statistics on parameters in the Lightning Network, which are of independent interest and compare the various implementations of Lightning nodes. Finally, we suggest mitigation techniques that make these attacks much harder to carry out.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.06564

zbMATH Keywords

network securityHTLClightning networkpayment channel networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Cites Work

• An Efficient Heuristic Procedure for Partitioning Graphs
• Community structure in social and biological networks
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• LockDown: balance availability attack against lightning network channels
• Topological Analysis of Bitcoin’s Lightning Network

Cited In (7)

• Epoch: enabling path concealing payment channel hubs with optimal path encryption
• Get me out of this payment! \texttt{Bailout}: an HTLC re-routing protocol
• \textsc{Hide} \& \textsc{Seek}: privacy-preserving rebalancing on payment channel networks
• Analysis and probing of parallel channels in the lightning network
• Sliding window challenge process for congestion detection
• Suborn channels: incentives against timelock bribes
• Maravedí: a secure and practical protocol to trade risk for instantaneous finality

Uses Software

• GitHub

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