Congestion attacks in payment channel networks
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:2147240)
Abstract: Payment channel networks provide a fast and scalable solution to relay funds, acting as a second layer to slower and less scalable blockchain protocols. In this paper, we present an accessible, low-cost attack in which the attacker paralyzes multiple payment network channels for several days. The attack is based on overloading channels with requests that are kept unresolved until their expiration time. Reaching the maximum allowed unresolved requests (HTLCs) locks the channel for new payments. The attack is in fact inherent to the way off-chain networks are constructed, since limits on the number of unresolved payments are derived from limits on the blockchain. We consider three main versions of the attack: one in which the attacker attempts to block as many high liquidity channels as possible, one in which it disconnects as many pairs of nodes as it can, and one in which it tries to isolate individual nodes from the network. We evaluate the costs of these attacks on Bitcoin's Lightning Network and compare how changes in the network have affected the cost of attack. Specifically, we consider how recent changes to default parameters in each of the main Lightning implementations contribute to the attacks. As we evaluate the attacks, we also look at statistics on parameters in the Lightning Network, which are of independent interest and compare the various implementations of Lightning nodes. Finally, we suggest mitigation techniques that make these attacks much harder to carry out.
Recommendations
- LockDown: balance availability attack against lightning network channels
- Payment trees: low collateral payments for payment channel networks
- Collusion attack from hubs in the blockchain offline channel network
- Ride the lightning: the game theory of payment channels
- An empirical analysis of privacy in the lightning network
Cites work
- An Efficient Heuristic Procedure for Partitioning Graphs
- Community structure in social and biological networks
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4208110 (Why is no real title available?)
- LockDown: balance availability attack against lightning network channels
- Topological Analysis of Bitcoin’s Lightning Network
Cited in
(18)- Timelocked bribing
- Payment trees: low collateral payments for payment channel networks
- \textsc{Brick}: asynchronous incentive-compatible payment channels
- LockDown: balance availability attack against lightning network channels
- Ride the lightning: the game theory of payment channels
- How to profit from payments channels
- Boomerang: redundancy improves latency and throughput in payment-channel networks
- \textsc{Cerberus} channels: incentivizing watchtowers for Bitcoin
- Chameleon hash time-lock contract for privacy preserving payment channel networks
- Collusion attack from hubs in the blockchain offline channel network
- Analysis and probing of parallel channels in the lightning network
- \textsc{Hide} \& \textsc{Seek}: privacy-preserving rebalancing on payment channel networks
- Suborn channels: incentives against timelock bribes
- Sliding window challenge process for congestion detection
- Maravedí: a secure and practical protocol to trade risk for instantaneous finality
- Epoch: enabling path concealing payment channel hubs with optimal path encryption
- Get me out of this payment! \texttt{Bailout}: an HTLC re-routing protocol
- Extras and premiums: local PCN routing with redundancy and fees
This page was built for publication: Congestion attacks in payment channel networks
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2147240)
