\textsc{Brick}: asynchronous incentive-compatible payment channels

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-64331-0_11zbMATH Open1493.91149arXiv1905.11360OpenAlexW3211052110MaRDI QIDQ2147243FDOQ2147243

Z. Avarikioti, Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias, Roger Wattenhofer, Dionysis Zindros

Publication date: 22 June 2022

Abstract: Off-chain protocols (channels) are a promising solution to the scalability and privacy challenges of blockchain payments. Current proposals, however, require synchrony assumptions to preserve the safety of a channel, leaking to an adversary the exact amount of time needed to control the network for a successful attack. In this paper, we introduce Brick, the first payment channel that remains secure under network asynchrony and concurrently provides correct incentives. The core idea is to incorporate the conflict resolution process within the channel by introducing a rational committee of external parties, called Wardens. Hence, if a party wants to close a channel unilaterally, it can only get the committee's approval for the last valid state. Brick provides sub-second latency because it does not employ heavy-weight consensus. Instead, Brick uses consistent broadcast to announce updates and close the channel, a light-weight abstraction that is powerful enough to preserve safety and liveness to any rational parties. Furthermore, we consider permissioned blockchains, where the additional property of auditability might be desired for regulatory purposes. We introduce Brick+, an off-chain construction that provides auditability on top of Brick without conflicting with its privacy guarantees. We formally define the properties our payment channel construction should fulfill, and prove that both Brick and Brick+ satisfy them. We also design incentives for Brick such that honest and rational behavior aligns. Finally, we provide a reference implementation of the smart contracts in Solidity.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.11360

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Cites Work

• Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2004
• The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol: Analysis and Applications
• Boomerang: redundancy improves latency and throughput in payment-channel networks
• \textsc{Cerberus} channels: incentivizing watchtowers for Bitcoin

Cited In (3)

• \textsc{Hide} \& \textsc{Seek}: privacy-preserving rebalancing on payment channel networks
• Suborn channels: incentives against timelock bribes
• Generalized channels from limited blockchain scripts and adaptor signatures

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