Resource holding potential, subjective resource value, and game theoretical models of aggressiveness signalling

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2006.01.001zbMATH Open1447.92567OpenAlexW1984934625WikidataQ48457877 ScholiaQ48457877MaRDI QIDQ2199244FDOQ2199244

Authors: Peter L. Hurd 

Publication date: 16 September 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.01.001

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zbMATH Keywords

communicationaggressivenessthreat displays

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Animal behavior (92D50) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the evolution of pure winner and loser effects: a game-theoretic model

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• The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour
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