Locality based wealth rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games

DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2018.08.029MaRDI QIDQ2201331zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 29 September 2020

Published in Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2018.08.029

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationcostly public goods gameslocality based wealth rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Utility theory for games (91A30)

Recommendations

• Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games
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Cites work

• Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection
• Strategy selection in evolutionary game dynamics on group interaction networks
• The dynamics of public goods
• The tragedy of the commons?

Cited in

(4)

• Individual behavior and social wealth in the spatial public goods game
• Local fairness in hedonic games via individual threshold coalitions
• Heterogeneous interaction radius based on emotional dynamics can promote cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable

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