Locality based wealth rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games

DOI10.1016/j.chaos.2018.08.029zbMath1442.91018OpenAlexW2891586645WikidataQ129234129 ScholiaQ129234129MaRDI QIDQ2201331

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 29 September 2020

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2018.08.029

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationcostly public goods gameslocality based wealth rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Utility theory for games (91A30)

Related Items (1)

Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable

Cites Work

• Strategy selection in evolutionary game dynamics on group interaction networks
• The tragedy of the commons?
• Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• The dynamics of public goods
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game

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