Optimal income taxation with Kalai wage bargaining and endogenous participation
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Publication:2247957
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0736-0zbMath1291.91163OpenAlexW2030934526MaRDI QIDQ2247957
Etienne Lehmann, Laurence Jacquet, Bruno Van der Linden
Publication date: 30 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0736-0
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Cites Work
- Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses
- Optimal taxation in the extensive model
- Two-person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms
- On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
- Effective Policy Tools and Quantity Controls
- The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Wage Negotiations
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses
- Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model
- Income Maintenance and Labor Force Participation
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
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