Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses
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Publication:4789653
DOI10.1162/003355302760193959zbMATH Open1074.91576OpenAlexW3121920701WikidataQ60034201 ScholiaQ60034201MaRDI QIDQ4789653FDOQ4789653
Authors: Emmanuel Saez
Publication date: 3 April 2003
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302760193959
Cited In (18)
- Pareto efficient income taxation without single-crossing
- Tax differentiation, lobbying, and welfare
- Optimal taxation in the extensive model
- Optimal Taxation, Marriage, Home Production, and Family Labor Supply
- Optimal income taxation with Kalai wage bargaining and endogenous participation
- Tagging and redistributive taxation with imperfect disability monitoring
- Relative effects of labor taxes on employment and working hours: role of mechanisms shaping working hours
- Discrete working time choice in an applied general equilibrium model
- Optimal welfare and in-work benefits with search unemployment and observable abilities
- Optimal income taxation with discrete skill distribution
- Stigma model of welfare fraud and non‐take‐up: Theory and evidence from OECD panel data
- Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses
- Optimal tax problems with multidimensional heterogeneity: a mechanism design approach
- Health, fairness and taxation
- Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy
- On the redistributive power of pensions
- Optimal taxation of income-generating choice
- Pareto-improving tax reforms and the earned income tax credit
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